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Over the last ten years, judges, scholars, and policy makers have arguedquite vehemently at times-about whether U.S. courts should use transnational
sources of law to interpret domestic legal doctrine. All eyes in this debatefocus
on the U.S. Supreme Court and its alleged use and misuse of transnationallaw.
And almost all the debates are normative. Some scholars and judges argue the
Court is correct to use transnationallaw. Others believe to do so is constitutional apostasy.
Still, the controversy seems to have generated more heat than light. Among
the clamor can be found little empirical work on the conditions under which
Supreme Court Justices actually use transnationallaw. Is it in fact the case that
only liberal Justices employ transnationallaw-or do conservatives as well? In
addition, there is little work on which countries Justices cite when they do use
transnationallaw. Do they cherry pick whichever country works best in a given
case, or is there a constraintvia legitimacy on which countries to examine and
cite?
The authorsprovide one of the most systematic empirical explorations of the
Court's use of transnational law to date. Their results challenge conventional
wisdom and upend the existing debates over transnationallaw. The data show
that Justices are more likely to reference transnationallaw when they exercise
judicial review and when they overturnprecedent, which likely explains much of
the controversy around the practice. Importantly, the data show, further, that all
Justices cite transnationallaw. Liberals cite transnationallaw when they render
liberal decisions, and conservatives cite transnational law when they render
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conservative decisions. Liberals and conservatives alike employ such law because both are ideologically conscious and strategicjudicial actors who seek to
supporttheir decisions with as much persuasivematerialas possible.
Finally, the results suggest that Justices cite countries with regard to their
political and legal characteristics.They cite what the public would consider to
be among the most legitimate countries across the globe. In other words, on the
whole, Justices seem to borrow from countries most like the United States.
Whether these results are good or bad is unclear; what is clear however is that
the normative debate over using transnationallaw must take a turn and address
the authors'findings.Scholars can then pay more attention to best practices and
the policy implications of cases that cite transnationallaw.
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INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that the United States Supreme Court occasionally-and
controversially-references transnational sources of law when deciding cases
concerning domestic doctrine.' Anyone who has followed the Court in recent
years knows that debate over the practice has, at times, been ferocious.2
Scholars and policy makers have divided into two groups: those that claim
courts should reference transnational law because it can serve as an objective
interpretive tool, and those who claim courts never should use such law because
it is irrelevant and its use is opportunistic. Others lay blame for these differences on the role of ideology, believing that the ideological divide is clear and
consistent.
Do these debates miss the mark? Are legal scholars arguing over immaterial
claims? If our data have anything to say on the matter, the answer is yes. Our
results promise to upend the normative debates.
Most of the controversy in recent years stems from a series of high profile,
extremely political Supreme Court cases, most of which featured deep divides

&

1. Transnationallaw includes but is not limited to foreign court opinions. As the term is commonly
used, it includes informal customs and practices, as well as nongovernmental sources of law. For a
definition, see infra note 64 and accompanying text. For the sources of transnational law that we
included in our sample, see infra section IV.A.
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003); ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law,
and ConstitutionalGovernance, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 59 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Progressive Constitutionalism and TransnationalLegal Discourse, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 285 (Jack M. Balkin
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail
Party of InternationalLaw: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 507 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Why TransnationalLaw Matters,
24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 745 (2006); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium,
119 HARv. L. REv. 129 (2005).
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between the Court's liberals and the Court's conservatives. For example, in
striking down a Texas statute banning homosexual sodomy in Lawrence v.
Texas, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited a host of transnational legal sources,
including a committee report to the British Parliament, British legislation
passed in 1967, decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, and the
general actions of "[o]ther nations." 3 Justice Scalia disagreed with the use of
these sources.4 The decision, of course, then triggered an even more heated
battle in the legal and political communities over whether Justices should use
transnational law to interpret domestic law. The issue emerged again in 2005 in
Roper v. Simmons, with Justice Scalia again chastising the majority for citing
transnational law to support its position on a death penalty issue, arguing that
"[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it
otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry." 5 In cases involving
the death penalty for mentally retarded prisoners and life without parole for
juveniles, the Court likewise entered the fray, and the Court's more consistent
conservatives again balked at the liberals' penchant for cosmopolitanist jurisprudence.6 In various cases, speeches, and publications, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Breyer, and Ginsburg later advocated that Justices at least look to transnational
law.7 Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, rejected the practice as
constitutionally unsound.
Despite the vehemence generated by these high profile cases, there have been
other cases in which the Court used transnational law without a peep from
purported opponents. One such recent case was Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.9 The petitioners in Kiobel were Nigerian civilians who resided in the
United States. They claimed that the Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation,
among others, helped the Nigerian government beat, kill, and rape them, and to
destroy their property-all done in retaliation because some Nigerian civilians

3. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576 (2003).
4. See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that it is cruel and unusual
punishment to impose life sentences without parole on juvenile defendants who have not committed
homicide); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that it is cruel and unusual punishment
to use the death penalty on individuals who are mentally retarded).
7. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Humanikind": The Value
of a Comparative Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575 (2005) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Decent Respect]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHo L. REv. 1 (2003); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. Soc'Y Ihr'L L. PROC. 348 (2002); Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Keynote Address at the
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-04-03.html.
8. See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Antonin Scalia, Outsourcing American Law: Foreign Law in
ConstitutionalInterpretation 1 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 152, 2009) (admitting that foreign
law could be appropriately used to interpret treaties and sometimes to interpret statutes).
9. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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had protested the environmental ramifications of the corporations' actions.o
The petitioners brought suit in the Southern District of New York under an act
passed in 1789-the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which states that "district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.""
Facing the Court, then, was whether and to what extent the ATS granted federal
courts jurisdiction to hear cases about international law violations committed
abroad.
Rather than focus solely on statutory text, original intent, domestic precedents, or canons of statutory construction, the conservative Chief Justice went
further and looked-surprisingly, for those who are accustomed to trenchant
critiques both from Chief Justice Roberts and other conservative Justices on the
Court-at transnational law and how its decision might impact international
comity2 and the balance of enforcement power for international law norms.' 3
The entire Court effectively endorsed a role for international law in resolving
the jurisdictional question. To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion
went about it in subtle, almost sly, fashion. He framed the problem in terms of
the Court's desire to not interfere with diplomatic relationships without explicit
authorization from Congress.14 For Chief Justice Roberts, the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes "guards against our courts
triggering . .. serious foreign policy consequences." Justice Breyer, echoing
similar concerns, made a much more explicit reference in his concurring
opinion to "principles and practices of foreign relations law."' 6 He cited the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law as "helpful" in discerning the
international norms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, finding ample support for a
broad standard of extraterritorial application for the ATS. 17 The Court rendered

10. See id. at 1662-63.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
12. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
13. See id. ("[F]ar from avoiding diplomatic strife, providing such a cause of action could have
generated it."); cf Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with
InternationalTrends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2014) ("While Kiobel was a surprise from a
domestic law context, it fits perfectly into broader patterns in international law.").
14. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts indirectly cited comity-based objections by other nations when he
cited a D.C. Circuit dissent by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, which itself cited instances of foreign nations
objecting to extraterritorial application of the ATS. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (listing objections
to the extraterritorial application of the ATS by Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1673-77 (reviewing a number of international law
sources and concluding that "the jurisdictional approach that [he] would use is analogous to, and
consistent with, the approaches of a number of other nations," and that "[i]t is consistent with the
approaches set forth in the Restatement").
17. Id. at 1673. The majority opinion articulated a test under which U.S. courts will have extraterritorial jurisdiction where the activities abroad "touch and concern" U.S. territory "with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application." Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). Justice
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a 9-0 decision on the merits, and none of the opinions raised any objections to
Chief Justice Roberts's or Justice Breyer's consideration of transnational legal
principles.
Given the backlash to the Court's use of transnational law in Lawrence,
Roper, and Atkins, it is perhaps surprising that the entire Court so nonchalantly
incorporated legal principles lifted from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law and other sources of transnational law. That surprise is squelched
by a richer appreciation of the context of the decision-one that acknowledges
that a citation to transnational law is hardly the key variable in predicting
controversy. Indeed, it is certainly the case that the courts routinely cited these
kinds of sources in previous cases dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
ATS,' 8 and, more broadly, in cases that might simply be thought of as transnational law cases masquerading as domestic cases. More importantly, the unanimity of the case differentiates it from some of the more controversial constitutional
cases from the mid-2000s. Placed in this broader context, it is easy to see that
the citation of transnational law might be a relative constant; what is variable is
the reliance that Justices put on it and the degree to which we hear complaints
about it. By focusing an inordinate amount of attention on the complaints in
highly ideology-driven cases, we risk missing the extent to which the practice is
deeply entrenched in current Court practice and effectively endorsed by all of
the Justices. In other words, perhaps the Court's use of transnational law in
Kiobel should not have been surprising. Indeed, perhaps the distinction between
Lawrence, Roper, and Atkins on the one hand, and Kiobel on the other, exists on
another dimension wholly unrelated to the actual fact of transnational law
citation. Could it be that all Justices use transnational law? Could it be that the
Court's use of transnational law is ideologically opportunistic but contextually
constrained at the same time? And, if so, what does this mean for the normative
debates among legal academics?
In this Article, we examine the conditions under which Justices cite transnational law as well as the countries and entities to which they cite-and our
results upend conventional political and legal beliefs. The results show that
Justices are more likely to reference transnational law when they exercise
judicial review and when they overturn precedent. What is more, the data show
Breyer's concurring opinion articulates a closely related multifactor jurisdictional test, where courts
will possess jurisdiction when
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or
(3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a
safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of
mankind.
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
18. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (looking to the United
Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and "international
consensus").
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that all Justices cite transnational law. That is, liberals cite transnational law
when they render liberal decisions, and conservatives cite transnational law
when they render conservative decisions. In short, the Court's pattern of citing
transnational law refuses to support the now common and largely rhetorical
debates about ideology. Instead, Justices use transnational law opportunistically. At the same time, the results suggest that Justices cite countries with
regard to their political and legal characteristics. They cite what the public
would consider to be among the most "legitimate" countries across the globe.
Put plainly, the assumption that citing foreign law is a principled disagreement
between judicial ideologies is a red herring: liberals and conservatives alike
employ foreign law because both are ideologically conscious, strategic judicial
actors who seek to support their decisions with as much persuasive material
as possible, and they have developed what one might call capacity or skill in
doing so.
This Article unfolds in five Parts. In Part I, we explain the debates over the
Court's citation of transnational law, focusing on the various legal, theoretical,
and normative arguments that support or oppose the practice. In Part II, we
examine the empirical literature on the Court's use of transnational law. As
Part II shows, scholars require a more comprehensive theory of the Court's use
of transnational law-specifically, one that asks questions about how and why
the Court cites foreign law and one that is tailored to resolve some of the
disputes about the practice. We offer this theory in Part III. We then provide one
of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of the factors determining citations to transnational law to date. Not only do we examine the conditions under
which Justices cite transnational law, we also examine the domestic political
and legal aspects of the countries to which they cite. In Part IV, we review
our dataset, providing background on some of the more specialized measures
we employ and our strategy for identifying the relevant citations that serve as
the unit of analysis. In Part V, we present our results. As we stated above, we
find that a realistic picture of the Supreme Court's practice of citing transnational law upsets the focus of existing debates. The citation of transnational
law appears to be just another instrumental technique of interpretation and
persuasion, like canons of statutory construction or deference regimes, which
generally fail to supersede Justices' policy-driven behavior. 9 Citation of transnational law is neither the bogeyman nor the savior that it is frequently made
out to be.

19. Cf James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2005) (empirically studying the use of canons in a
subset of statutory interpretation cases and finding that ideology accounts for some of the selective use
of canons); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLuM. L. REV. 1727,
1727 (2010) (finding some evidence that Justices apply administrative law "deference regimes"
sporadically but in line with their ideological preferences).
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I. THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL, AND NORMATIVE DEBATES OVER USING
TRANSNATIONAL LAW

The debate over citing transnational law has been called "mad and largely
fruitless." 20 Nevertheless, we believe that criticism of the Court's citation of
transnational law can be divided into two separate debates. 2 ' The first debate
centers on whether courts must follow transnational law. On the one hand, some
scholars claim that transnational law is part of a natural, global law that binds
all sovereign nations regardless of their specific legal traditions.2 2 On the other
hand, those with a more positivistic conception of law argue that these legal
sources are not relevant to the U.S. context.2 3 In other words, the question is
whether transnational sources are in some way a part of U.S. law, and therefore
must be brought to bear on questions of U.S. constitutional and statutory
interpretation. The second, more pragmatic debate centers on whether courts
often ought to follow transnational law because of some purported interpretive
benefits it may offer.24 On one side of this debate is Justice Breyer, who argues
that using transnational law simply "involves opening your eyes to what is
going on elsewhere, taking what you learn for what it is worth, and using it as a
point of comparison where doing so will prove helpful."2 5 On the other side is
Justice Scalia, who argues that interpretation ought to be focused solely on U.S.
legal materials because of the practical difficulties created by consulting transna-

20. See Kim Lane Scheppele, "Looking over the Crowd and Picking Your Friends": The Social
World of Legal Cases 1 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article = 11 44&context= schmoozepapers.
21. There have been other attempts to pare down the debate into "essential division[s]." See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons
of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2007). Daniel Farber argues that the division is between
"internationalists and constitutional nationalists." Id. We agree that this classification captures a good
deal of the important differences in the theoretical defenses offered by judges and academics, but we
also see additional dimensions, which this Part addresses.
22. See JEREMY WALDRON, "PARny LAWS COMMON To ALL MANKIND": FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN

COURTs 20 (2012) (noting that there seem to be "'laws common to all mankind"' that function
as an "overarching system"); see also Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism,52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 669-70 (2005) (noting that certain recent decisions citing transnational or comparative law implicitly employ a natural law theory that emphasizes fundamental
rights).
23. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 291,
292-94 (2005). Of course, this distinction is fairly blunt. As Jeremy Waldron has pointed out:
Historians of jurisprudence have spent gallons of ink on the question of whether [the Law of
Nations] was conceived as natural law or positive law. The fact is that at various times and for
various purposes it has been both, as well as the product of a sort of reflective equilibrium
between the two.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 136 (footnote omitted).
24. See WALDRON, supra note 22, at 8 (noting that "when Supreme Court justices like Kennedy and
Stephen Breyer argue in other forums that citing foreign law is sometimes a good idea ... they have
defended the practice in mostly pragmatic terms").
25. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
ConversationBetween Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 NT'L J. CONsT. L. 519, 524
(2005).
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tional sources. In what follows, we recreate these debates and later discuss
what, if anything, an empirical study can do to resolve them.
A. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS BINDING, NATURAL LAW

Some more monist scholars and policy makers seem to believe in a set of
transnational, universalist, and globalist legal norms, often couched in terms
of natural law theory, to which sovereign nations are bound to follow in case of
conflict between domestic law and transnational law. 2 6 "[T]ransnationalist jurisprudence," as the name suggests, "assumes America's political and economic
interdependence with other nations operating within the international legal
system," and does not "distinguish sharply between the relevance of foreign and
international law, recognizing that one prominent feature of a globalizing world
is the emergence of a transnational law, particularly in the area of human rights,
that merges the national and the international." 27 For Dean Harold Koh, courts
are bound to follow international practice "not simply to promote American
aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international judicial system." 2 8 Indeed, there is a rich historical lineage for this notion
of transnational jurisprudence. The Supreme Court long ago seemed to want to
enmesh international law and domestic law. 2 9 For example, in Hilton v. Guyot,
the Court claimed that
[i]nternational law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including
not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been
appropriately called the "law of nations," but also questions arising under
what is usually called "private international law," or the "conflict of laws,"
and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one
nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of
another nation-is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation
between man and man, duly submitted to their determination. 3 0

26. See WALDRON, supra note 22, at 20; Alford, supra note 22, at 659-73; Delahunty & Yoo, supra
note 23, at 292-94. Justice Breyer, for instance, refers to a "global legal enterprise," which American
courts are, to some extent, bound to follow as a matter of natural rights and moral duties. See Breyer,
supra note 7. For a discussion of monism (and its foil, dualism), see Melissa A. Waters, Creeping
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporationof Human Rights Treaties, 107 CoLUM.
L. REV. 628, 636-43 (2007).
27. Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 53 (2004).
28. Id. at 53-54.
29. See id. at 44 ("Not surprisingly, the early Supreme Court saw the judicial branch as a central
channel for making international law part of U.S. law. The original design and early practice of our
courts envisioned that they would not merely accept, but would actively pursue, an understanding and
incorporation of international law standards out of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind."); see
also WALDRON, supra note 22.
30. 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
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Similar statements can be seen in The Paquete Habana.3 ' There is in fact
precedent for the transnationalist vision, but most of the most complete statements are to be found in academic circles in the discussion of comparative
constitutionalism and transnational law.32 The important point is that, given that
international law surrounds many important legal disputes, many of which are
grounded in domestic law, transnational law will almost always be relevant in
important constitutional decisions in the United States if one takes this view.
There are, however, equally strong theoretical reasons to reject the transnational jurisprudence approach, reasons which ultimately stem from a legal
positivism-influenced dualism and a concern that foreign law will undo domestic law if it is automatically relevant in domestic disputes and is given a
relatively equal footing without explicit incorporation through law-making
processes. 3 3 The so-called nationalist jurisprudence that can occasionally be
traced to Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas is "characterized by commitments
to territoriality, extreme deference to national executive power and political
institutions, and resistance to comity or international law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives." 34 The fear here is that the U.S. Constitution,
which is-under a positivistic or dualistic conception of sovereignty and legal
authority-the only document from which judges can draw legal authority,
would be subverted if judges considered any transnational sources. Academics,
too, have articulated this kind of worry. Delahunty and Yoo, for instance, argue
that, to the extent that Justices and academics advocate for a "convergence"
between domestic law and foreign law, this convergence could give "decisional
effect to foreign materials"-an outcome that could denigrate and demote
domestic law. 3 5 They likewise argue that giving decisional effect to transnational materials is indefensible under current theories of judicial review. If
judges only obtain the power to strike legislation in service of a popular
sovereign and a written constitution, they argue, judges' use of materials
exogenous to domestic law makes judicial review theoretically indefensible
except on the nondemocratic grounds that citing foreign sources will simply
help the judge reach an abstractly "ideal" decision. This positivistic theory-wellestablished in the larger literature on legal theory and, for all practical purposes,
31. See 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
32. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that ius gentium, or the Law of Nations, speaks to
domestic law problems and serves as "a guiding ideal for a uniform body of transnational law").
33. For the classic treatment, see H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961). For recent treatments
of the distinction between positivism and natural law, see Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between
Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1613 (2000), and Brian Leiter, Why
Legal Positivism (Again)? (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 442,
2013), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2323013.
34. Koh, supra note 27, at 52.
35. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 23, at 295-96 (emphasis omitted); see also Ilya Shapiro, The Use
and Misuse of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, CAo Ar LIBERTY (May 19, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://www.
cato.org/blog/use-misuse-foreign-law-us-courts.
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the governing legal ideology in American legal culture 3 6-strongly challenges
the transnational jurisprudence approach.
According to Delahunty and Yoo, "we enjoy our current Constitution precisely because the Americans of the late Eighteenth Century rejected their
relationship with Europe" and sought to erect "an 'effective barrier against the
Europeanization of American politics"'; therefore, "relying on the decisions of
postwar Europeans who were neither part of the American polity that drafted
and ratified the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, nor descended from
ancestors who shared a common political system with the Framers" cannot be
defended as part of the American legal tradition.37 So the argument goes:
"[C]iting foreign law, using it to support a given reading of domestic law[,]
undermines democratic self-governance. The interpretation of the U.S. Constitution should depend on that document's text, structure, and history, what it means
in the context of the American polity." 3 8
It is not surprising, then, that defenders of transnational law have reacted by
defending it on positivistic grounds. That is, many argue that, for one reason or
another, the American legal tradition always anticipated and expected the
incorporation of transnational materials. For example, Daniel Farber argues
that citation of transnational law has been a mainstay in the American legal tradition from the beginning, and that such citations even appeared in wellknown opinions written by Chief Justice John Marshall.3 9 Along these lines, he
states:
Citation of foreign law did not merely reflect the paucity of relevant domestic
precedent. Rather, it reflected a deeply held understanding of law, in which
background legal principles did not derive from any particular jurisdiction.
Such background principles percolated through specific legal systems, filling
gaps and providing context for positive enactments such as statutes and
written constitutions.40

36. See Leiter, supra note 33; see also Waldron, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that "Justice Holmes's
view in Erie is said to have lent to legal positivism the authority of the Supreme Court," but also noting
that "positivism's ... credentials are suspect today" and have been widely questioned by such legal
theorists as Ronald Dworkin).
37. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 23, at 310 (quoting PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONuF, FEDERAL UNION,
MOD iRN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONs, 1776-1814, at 176 (1993)).
38. Shapiro, supra note 35.
39. See Farber,supra note 21, at 1336; see also Koh, supra note 27, at 44 ("The original design and
early practice of our courts envisioned that they would not merely accept, but would actively pursue, an
understanding and incorporation of international law standards out of a decent respect for the opinions
of mankind."); David M. O'Brien, More Smoke Than Fire: The Rehnquist Court's Use of Comparative
Judicial Opinions and Law in the Construction of ConstitutionalRights, 22 J.L. & POL. 83, 89 (2006)

("The Supreme Court has, in fact, long drawn on sources of comparative and international law, ranging
from observations on comparative legal systems and practices to works by foreign commentators,
constitutional and statutory provisions, international treaties and declarations, and other high courts'
judicial decisions." (footnotes omitted)).
40. Farber, supra note 21, at 1336.
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On this account, foreign law operates much as canons of statutory construction do: as tools for interpreting the inevitable ambiguities left in even the
most coherent positivist legal code. 4 ' Citation to foreign law thus could be
defended as an appeal to background principles that are implicitly incorporated
into the American legal system and potentially even decisive in the absence of
better evidence from within the legal system. This positivist defense of transnational law is also apparent in Dean Harold Koh's argument that certain passages
in the U.S. Constitution seem to "implicitly refer[] to a community standard." 4 2
One need look no further than the clear constitutional supremacy of treaties
over statutes or the early enactment of the Alien Tort Statute to see that the
Framers no doubt intended that judges be familiar with more than purely
domestic law.
In sum, the argument over whether judges must use transnational law has
divided relatively cleanly. On the one side are the natural law or monistic
types who believe the practice is necessary as part of a global, transnational
legal system that transcends national sovereignty and represents something
of a natural law of nations. On the other side are positivists or dualists who
argue about whether the practice is faithful to the American legal tradition and the U.S. Constitution. Often, debates in the Supreme Court's cases
seem to take on one or another of these theoretical stances. Nevertheless,
these are not the only arguments about transnational law. Indeed, the argument that courts must apply transnational law is more of an academic argument
than anything else, and no Justice on the Supreme Court seems particularly
serious about pursuing that ideal consistently. Instead, most of the focus in
terms of transnational law comes in the form of a debate about whether courts
should look to it as just another interpretive tool. It is to this debate that we now
turn.
B. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS AN INTERPRETATIVE TOOL

A more practical argument for the use of transnational law has been articulated by some Supreme Court Justices, led chiefly by Justice Breyer. For
example, Breyer argues: "If I have a difficult case and a human being called a
judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem, why
should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may learn
something. 4 3

41.

Cf.

WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

847-48 (4th ed. 2007); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 32-33.
42. Koh,-supra note 27, at 46 (emphasis omitted).
43. Dorsen, supra note 25, at 523; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other
nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our
own. But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
solutions to a common legal problem. . . ." (citation omitted)); id. at 921 n. 1 (majority opinion).
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
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For Breyer, transnational law is not dispositive. Instead, it is simply another
tool he uses to interpret what he believes to be an unclear legal question.'
Breyer claims to use such sources as part of a more general process of
interpretation that requires judges to consult as many diverse sources of information as they can find 4 5-a "more is better" approach to legal interpretation. And
he is not alone. Justice Ginsburg has made similar remarks.4 6 Somewhat
recently, Justice Kennedy also articulated a variant of this defense. Writing in
Graham v. Florida,he stated:
The Court has treated the laws and practices of other nations and international
agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are
binding or controlling but because the judgment of the world's nations that a
particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency
demonstrates that the Court's rationale has respected reasoning to support it.4 7
Of course, there is also strong opposition to the Court's use of transnational
law-even as "merely" an interpretive tool. For opponents, transnational law
does not really help the judge or the Court, but in fact undermines the rule of
law. 4 8 It does so for two reasons. First, as has often been suggested about judges
who use legislative history, it could be the case that when picking transnational
legal sources, judges simply look out over a crowd and pick out their friends. 49

44. See Dorsen, supra note 25, at 523 ("I realize full well that the decisions of foreign courts do not
bind American courts. Of course they do not."). Jeremy Waldron makes a similar point, arguing:
Of course it is ultimately our decision: "[lit is a Constitution for the United States of America
that we are expounding." But that does not preclude turning to the legal consensus of civilized
nations for assistance any more than the American origin of an epidemic precludes Americans' turning to foreign scientists for guidance.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 144 (footnote omitted).
45. See Dahlia Lithwick, Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar, SLATE (Dec. 6, 2006, 4:31 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2006/1 2/Justice-grover versus_Justice_
oscar.html ("Breyer has six interpretive tools-text, history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a
statute, and the consequences. In his view, it's a mistake to ignore the last two.").
46. See Ginsburg, Decent Respect, supra note 7, at 576 ("If US experience and decisions can be
instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so we can learn from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against
charters securing basic rights.").
47. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). Despite some speculation that Justice Sotomayor rejected the citation of
foreign law in her confirmation hearings, she joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in Graham, leading
scholars to speculate that her views are very much in concurrence with Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy
on these issues, her testimony notwithstanding. See Jonathan H. Adler, Justice Sotomayor Graham, and
InternationalLaw, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 2010, 10:28 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/05/22/
Justice-sotomayor-graham-and-international-law.
48. See WALDRON, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that Justice Scalia has argued that the Court is
"unprincipled and opportunistic" in its citation of foreign law).
49. See Dorsen, supra note 25, at 530 ("The criticism can be encapsulated in Judge Harold
Leventhal's remark: Using legislative history is like looking out over the crowd at a cocktail party to try
to identify your friends."); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) ("It sometimes seems that citing
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In other words, a judge, faced with a dizzying array of legal systems from
around the world-some of the common law ilk and some with a civil law
lineage, some more autocratic and some more democratic-can "find anything
[she] want[s]. If [she does]n't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in
the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever." 5 0 This easy
availability of reinforcing evidence raises concerns that even the most thoroughly pragmatic and open-minded judge, committed simply to trying to learn
from consideration of foreign sources, might be susceptible to "confirmation
bias."5 1 A less charitable label for this is cherry picking. In fact, even supporters
of transnational law admit that in comparative constitutional law, "the reliance
on only one side of the argument, bolstered by citations to only a few of the
many cases on point, is common." 52 Selective citation is, of course, a reality in
any case, as there are always more potentially relevant precedents and authorities that could be cited and which may detract from the ultimate conclusion.
There are diminishing returns to exhaustive documentation of every such
source, especially when the goal is at least in part to write opinions that will be
accepted as legitimate and binding.5 3 But as Chief Justice Roberts suggested in
remarks from his confirmation hearing, the problem seems particularly acute in
the context of citation of foreign law, where the diversity of potential legal
sources far exceeds the diversity of potential sources stemming from domestic
legal sources.
The second argument against using transnational law as an interpretive tool is
that it is difficult to carry out correctly and, as a result, is usually done poorly.
Justice Scalia, making just this point, has argued:
One of the difficulties of using foreign law is that you don't understand what
the surrounding jurisprudence is. So that you can say, for example, "Russia

legislative history is still, as my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends."').
50. Peggy McGuinness, Judge Roberts Hearing: Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Cases,
OPINIO JURIs (Sep. 13, 2005, 5:14 PM), http://Iawofnations.blogspot.com/2005/09/judge-roberts-hearinguse-of-foreign.html; see also Dorsen, supra note 25, at 521 ("When it agrees with what the justices
would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn't agree we don't use it.").
51. Cf Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120,
133-34 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (noting the existence of "a
number of phenomena often labeled collectively as confirmation bias" that lead people "to seek
information that if consistent with the current hypothesis would yield positive feedback" and to
"examine evidence expected to confirm the hypothesis rather than evidence that could disconfirm the
hypothesis"); see also JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 159-62 (3d ed. 2000) (noting research
on "confirmation bias" but urging a different label, "congruence bias," to more accurately describe the
findings of the research).
52. Scheppele, supra note 20, at 1.
53. Indeed, Curry and Miller conducted an experiment and determined that referencing foreign legal
judgments can erode public support for the Court. See Brett Curry & Banks Miller, Lookingfor Law in
All the Wrong Places? Foreign Law and Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 POL. & Pol'Y 1094,
1107-08 (2008).
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follows Miranda," but you don't know that Russia doesn't have an exclusionary rule.
And you can say every other country of the world thinks that holding
somebody for twelve years under sentence of death is cruel and unusual, but
you don't know that these other countries don't have habeas corpus systems
which allow repeated applications to state and federal court, so that the reason
it takes twelve years here is because the convicted murderer himself continues
to file appeals that are continuously rejected.54
Judges who wish to learn something from transnational materials have to
make sure they make apples-to-apples comparisons. Doing so can be resource
intensive and introduce the risk of misapplication. Given that judges tend to
be resource constrained and rely heavily on persuasive amicus briefs for
information about the law,5 6 there are legitimate reasons to believe that judges
will find false similarities when they (often) have incomplete information.
Still, even among opponents, there are some instances in which using transnational law is appropriate-but these instances are limited to referencing English
common law. Justice Scalia has given effect to this argument. For Scalia, and
those who agree with him, transnational law is "irrelevant" unless it directly
sheds light on the original understanding of the American constitutional framework.5 Justice Scalia's originalist approach allows Justices to consult certain
kinds of foreign law sources. Because the English common law, as well as the
commentaries of William Blackstone, was the direct inspiration for many terms
of art in the Constitution, Justice Scalia claims that "the reality is [that he]
use[s] foreign law more than anybody on the Court. But it's all old English
law." 5 " Again, Justice Scalia's more positivistic outlook on the American constitutional framework shines through, as any text that does not meet these criteria
is immaterial, and anything that is immaterial should not be cited.5
These two concerns about the arbitrariness or difficulty of citing transnational
law are ultimately susceptible to empirical testing, but no existing studies

54. Dorsen, supra note 25, at 528-29.
55. See David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis,
STUD. 297, 302 (2006) ("[T]he limited ways that federal courts use foreign
authority raises real questions about the ad hoc and inexpert nature of that use.").

3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL

56. See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 106 (2008).

57. Dorsen, supra note 25, at 525 ("[M]y theory of what to do when interpreting the American
Constitution is to try to understand what it meant, what it was understood by the society to mean when
it was adopted. And I don't think it has changed since then. That approach used to be orthodoxy until
about sixty years ago. Every judge would have told you that's what we do. If you have that philosophy,
obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: old English law-because phrases like 'due
process,' and the 'right of confrontation' were taken from English law, and were understood to mean
what they meant there.").
58. Id.
59. See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007
U. ILL. L. REv. 637, 676 n.273 (citing Justice Scalia's statement: "I mean, go ahead and indulge your
curiosity! Just don't put it in your opinions!").

16

THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 103:1

directly address the Court's performance, even if agreement can be had on an
acceptable theoretical baseline against which to judge performance. Although
we remain agnostic about an appropriate theory, we do provide a detailed
analysis of the Court's citation patterns, and we hope it is the first of many
attempts to understand and address some of the pragmatic claims on behalf of
and against citation of transnational law. 6 0
Before we proceed to examine the empirical research on the Court's use of
transnational law, we should point out that the argument over using transnational law has taken on an ideological dimension. Perhaps not surprisingly,
given the dividing lines among normative camps (and the positions of the
Justices in the salient cases discussed in the introduction), the debate over using
transnational law has been framed in terms of liberals versus conservatives.
After all, two of the three Justices who most publicly support the use of
transnational law are Breyer and Ginsburg,62 and they reside in the Court's
liberal bloc. That Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor have been noted to
support the practice should caution against jumping to any hasty conclusions,
however. Thus, the question is ultimately one that needs to be answered by
empirical analysis.
In short, scholars have divided into camps: those who believe judges must
look to transnational law and those who believe they may not, and those who
believe judges should look to transnational law as just another interpretive tool
and those who believe its use is opportunistic. These are important normative
questions, to be sure, but the scholarship on transnational law largely lacks
empirical support. That is, few scholars have systematically examined which
Justices reference transnational law and under what circumstances. Nor have
they examined the domestic political conditions of the countries they cite and
whether those conditions influence citation practices. In what follows, we
review the empirical studies and discuss how they relate back to the normative
debates above.
II.

PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW CITATION

Perhaps the debates about transnational law are in fact, "mad and largely
fruitless." But if they are, perhaps that is because of a lack of understanding of
how and when the Supreme Court cites transnational law.M In other words,

60. See infra Part V.
61. See Farber, supra note 21, at 1340 ("Roughly speaking, conservatives generally have attacked
the Court's use of foreign citations while liberals have defended it.").
62. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional Courts,
21 CARDOzo L. REV. 1045 (2000); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:
An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOzo L. REv. 253 (1999); Breyer, supra note 7;
Ginsburg, Decent Respect, supra note 7.
63. See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 85, 87; see also infra Table 4 and accompanying text.
64. The term transnationallaw has grown in popularity in recent years vis-h-vis more traditional
terms that describe much of the same content (e.g., international law) because it is broader than
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there have been few empirical studies of the Justices' behavior that might
shine some light on assumptions made in the normative debate, possibly
because some see the question as primarily or exclusively normative. 6 5 Accordingly, in what follows, we discuss the extant empirical literature and lay out
and test several theories about the use of foreign materials in Supreme Court
cases.
We start by observing that several components of the normative debates
seem susceptible to resolution by empirical evidence. Some of the points of
disagreement concern how ubiquitous the citation of transnational materials
is-if it is widespread and done by liberal and conservative Justices alike,
then the inference that such practices are for all intents and purposes part
of the American legal tradition is strengthened. We might, therefore, want to
know how often transnational materials are cited and who cites them. Likewise, some of the most important disagreements concern the consistency of
citing foreign materials. Are Justices cherry picking when they cite transnational law, or are there other factors at work? We might therefore want to
know more about which Justices cite foreign materials and under what circumstances, as well as what they tend to cite. To the extent that there is a
great deal of consistency and reasoned selection in such citations, that might
alter how scholars take some of the criticisms of the practice. In short, the
normative debates in this area of jurisprudence are somewhat susceptible to
resolution, or at least to recalibration, in light of empirical evidence. We hope to
advance the discussion around these normative debates in our empirical analysis
in Part V.
By point of contrast, prior studies of the Supreme Court's practice of citing
transnational materials have focused mostly on different questions that, while
important, have not been able to help resolve or refocus the normative debates.
These extant studies look at, for instance, the rate or frequency of citation over
the Court's history, as well as changes in the citation practices of briefing parties
and amici. These studies vary in their methodology and often come to different
conclusions. For example, Calabresi and Zimdahl search the historical record
for "some of the most striking" examples where the Court borrowed from other
countries.66 Using what they admit is a nonrandom sample of cases, they find

international law and encompasses law that was not necessarily generated through formal state
institutions. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study "Transnational" Law, I U.C. IRvINE
L. REv. 97, 103-06 (2011) (defining it as "law that transcends or crosses borders but may not be
formally enacted by states").
65. See Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, ConstitutionalComparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) ("Past practice, however, is only a partial answer to debates
over whether transnational law should be considered in resolving questions of U.S. constitutional law,
debates linked to a broader set of disagreements about constitutional interpretation.").
66. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 743, 754 (2005).
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that, while employing transnational law is not new, "the Court has cited foreign
law with much more frequency in far more important constitutional cases" in
recent Terms.
Still, other, more rigorous studies have cast doubt on Calabresi and Zimdahl's
findings. David O'Brien, for example, looks at citation counts to assess how
often individual Justices on the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) employed foreign
law. He finds that the dominant pattern is a paucity of citations, even among the
Justices who are outspoken in their support of citation to transnational materials.6 8 For instance, Justice Breyer employed foreign law, foreign practices, or
foreign judicial decisions in only five cases, three of which were dissents from
denial of review in death penalty cases. 6 9 This compares with four such
citations for the Court's most outspoken critic of the practice (Justice Scalia),
and with only one such citation by Breyer's compatriot, Justice Ginsburg.70 On
the whole, then, O'Brien finds that the practice of citing foreign materials is
quite limited and seems to lack clear ideological dividing lines. 7
One of the most exhaustive empirical studies to date on transnational law
comes from David Zaring, who examined how often U.S. federal courts (district
courts, circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court) between 1945 and
2005 cited the decisions of a select group of foreign high courts. 72 Zaring's data
suggest that federal courts nowadays (from 1995 to the present) cite foreign law
more than they did in the past (though not to a significant degree), but that when
they do cite foreign courts, they do so not in cases involving domestic doctrine,
but when the case involves a question about the content of transnational law
itself, such as whether a claim is cognizable under the Law of Nations, or
where the courts coordinate "parallel proceedings before a foreign tribunal."7 4
Like O'Brien, Zaring finds that the use of transnational materials to support the
interpretation of domestic law is a relatively uncommon practice. Zaring's
coding allowed him to disaggregate citations into several categories, one of
which was the use of foreign precedent to support the interpretation of domestic
law. Within that category, only thirty cases involved the interpretation of the
Constitution; thirty-four involved interpretation of a statute, such as the ATS or

67. Id. at 755; see also Jerry Goldman & Timothy R. Johnson, Exploring the Use of Foreign Law
and Foreign Sources in the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision Making Process (Sept. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at htttp://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p4144_index.html.
68. See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 108-09.
69. See id. at 109.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 108 ("The Court's references to foreign legal sources were not historically unprecedented and remained infrequent and limited.").
72. See Zaring, supra note 55, at 301, 304. The foreign high courts in Zaring's study were from
Mexico, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Israel, India,
South Africa, and Australia, as well as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice. Id. at 304-05.
73. See id. at 300-01; see e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
74. Zaring, supra note 55, at 301.
75. See id.

2014]

UPENDING A GLOBAL DEBATE

19

admiralty statutes; and sixteen involved interpretation of state law. 7 6 Given that
these cases represent only a fraction of all the cases where the courts cited
transnational law-they could do so, for instance, to interpret international or
foreign law 7 7 -one is left with the unavoidable conclusion that the muchmaligned use of foreign materials for constitutional interpretation purposes in
the highly salient "troika" of Roper v. Simmons, Lawrence v. Texas, and Atkins
v. Virginia is rare and unrepresentative.
As illuminating as these studies are, they leave important questions unanswered. First, these studies are unable to answer the broader questions of when
Justices cite foreign law. The O'Brien study suggests an answer: almost never.
But considering it is commonplace for a critic of citation to foreign law to argue
that it is employed more often by liberal Justices, providing a cover for them to
enforce their values on the general populace, it is worth statistically analyzing
the individual behavior of Justices to find out whether ideology and other
factors do in fact make it more likely that they will cite transnational law.
Second, consider the Zaring study. Because it is limited to citation counts for
only a select group of foreign courts, it potentially misses a good deal of the
action, and perhaps in the places where we might be most concerned about
courts' citation to foreign law. Some of the most important criticisms offered by
the likes of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts focus precisely on the
assertion that it is problematic for judges to look at less prominent and prestigious courts from nations that differ greatly from the United States on important
dimensions.7 9 By selecting particular courts on the basis of characteristics that
would make U.S. courts likely to cite them ex ante, Zaring cannot answer
questions about whose law judges tend to cite, and, consequently, whether there
is any truth to the criticism that judges can and do use the diversity of legal
systems around the world to cherry pick citations that support their preformed
conclusions.
In short, the extant literature focuses on assessing how frequently judges cite
foreign law, finding that the Court has long considered foreign law in a wide
variety of contexts-but with little frequency. This is an important contribution,
and suggests that citing transnational law might not be groundbreakingly new.
But this research also cannot answer questions related to the nuanced critiques
offered by academics and the Justices themselves-critiques that rest on assumptions about how and when the Justices invoke transnational law. Accordingly, in
what follows, we offer a theory designed to fill some of these gaps in the
literature and provide testable hypotheses about the determinants of judicial use
of transnational law.

76. See id. at 315-19.
77. See id. at 306.
78. Id. at 306, 330-31.
79. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Dorsen, supra note 25, at 521 ("When it
agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn't
agree we don't use it.").
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OF THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Our theoretical starting point, based on decades of scholarship, is that Justices
are strategic judicial decisionmakers who seek to pursue their policy goals but
are constrained from so doing by a host of internal and external norms and
actors.80 More specifically, the Supreme Court lacks the power to enforce its
decisions. Instead, it must rely on citizens' and policymakers' beliefs in its
legitimacy, something it earns by writing principled, logical, and well-supported
opinions. As Justice Frankfurter once observed, the Court's authority "ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."8 1 In order to
effectuate their policy goals, Justices must ensure that the opinions that justify
those positions have legal and logical support. One way Justices can support
their decisions is to reference transnational practices and transnational law.
Because they must legitimate their positions, we believe Justices will turn to
as many sources of support as they can, including transnational sources of law.
Supposing there is little (or no) domestic legal precedent on which to rely to
support a Justice's preferred policy position, what can Justices do? One option
is to accept that current domestic law fails to support the position and refuse to
move forward with the Justice's desired legal change. Yet, if we know anything
about judicial behavior, Justices will not be so dissuaded. Another option, then,
is for the Justice to move forward with his or her desired legal change and offer
up as much extralegal or nondomestic support for the position as possible.
Transnational legal sources can fit the bill here. 82
To be sure, although there are no studies that analyze whether Justices cite
foreign law to protect or enhance opinions, there are a number of studies that
examine how Justices use other institutional tools to do so. Zink, Spriggs, and
Scott find that Justices can use unanimity and the favorable treatment of
precedent to signal their impartiality and build legitimacy.83 Cassillas, Enns, and
Wohlfarth highlight how the Court modifies its behavior as a function of the
perceived threats to its legitimacy stemming from ignoring public opinion.8 4
Owens, Wedeking, and Wohlfarth find that the Court will alter the language of

80. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,

1999).
81. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
82. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 138 ("Reference to official judgments, whether local or foreign,
helps rescue judges from a feeling of intellectual nakedness. Just asserting that it is objectively wrong
to executive individuals for crimes committed when they were children might be viewed as an
expression of subjective sentiment rather than an insight into moral fact.").
83. See James R. Zink, James F. Spriggs II & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The Influence of
DecisionAttributes on Individuals' Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909, 909 (2009).
84. See Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion
Constrainsthe U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. Sci. 74,74 (2011).
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its opinions to protect its policies from a hostile Congress.

And Horowitz finds

that the Court is more likely to cite more authoritative case law when its
decisions might be met with hostility from political actors and the public.
Building on the logic of these studies, we believe Justices will cite transnational sources of law to prop up the logic of their opinions. Justices might utilize
transnational law in these instances as "'logical reinforcement'. . . . in which the
Court looks to foreign law and practice to demonstrate that its decisions are
logical and supported by reason," so much so that other countries have made the
same legal choices as those advocated in the case.8 This type of citation
method gives Justices more fighting ground with other Justices, Congress, and
the public. That is, even if the use of transnational legal sources might stir up
controversy, ultimately it is controversy that is unlikely to harm the Court, its
Justices, or the decision itself. Indeed, citing transnational law, even when
sparking domestic controversy, can begin a discussion of where the United
States stands in relation to peers and turn the debate away from the Court's
opinion to broader ground. As we discuss in section III.A below, we expect
Justices to find transnational law attractive as a supportive tool when they
overturn precedent, engage in judicial review, and render ideologically motivated decisions. Moreover, as we discuss in section III.B below, we also expect
them to draw from countries the public will likely find most appropriate, such as
countries with a perceived democratic government, common language, or a
history of good trade relations.
A. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH JUSTICES CITE TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1. Overruling Precedent
Justices may be more likely to reference transnational law when they break
with precedent and when they engage in judicial review. One of the key
elements of legal stability-and the Court's legitimacy-is stare decisis. The
norm of stare decisis holds that judges and Justices should treat similar cases
similarly. When the facts of one case are similar to the facts of a previously
decided case, courts should apply the holdings decided in those previous
cases."8 Scheb and Lyons show that the public believes the Court should adhere
to stare decisis. 89 Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck call stare decisis "the defin-

85. See Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How the Supreme Court Alters
Opinion Language to Evade CongressionalReview, I J.L. & COURTS 35, 35 (2013).
86. See Jeremy D. Horowitz, Legitimacy, Ideology, and the Use of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme
Court 2-3 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
87. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 66, at 899. Of course, the Supreme Court sometimes does
depart from its strict adherence to the norm of stare decisis. For a useful discussion of the importance
and limits of stare decisis, see Planned ParenthoodofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
88. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 571 (1987).
89. See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular
Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 186
(2001).
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ing feature of American courts . . . [a feature that] represents the most critical
piece of American judicial infrastructure." 9 0 Lindquist and Klein also argue that
"[o]ne of the Court's most important claims to legitimacy is the proposition that
its decisions are not determined solely by the justices' personal policy preferences but are influenced as well by their understandings of what 'the law'
requires in a given case." 9 1
The Court's legitimacy can suffer when Justices ignore or break from precedent.9 2 Therefore, Justices must amass considerable support for their positions
when they do so. Justices seeking to overturn precedent may need to interject as
many supporting considerations into their opinions as possible. They may even
reach out and cite transnational sources of law to support their decision. By
mustering law from elsewhere, Justices might protect their opinions and make
them look more reasonable. They might even frame the debate so as to make
their opponents appear on the wrong side of international consensus. This is
precisely what Justice Kennedy tried to do in Lawrence and what Justice
Stevens tried to do in Roper.
2. Engaging in Judicial Review
For similar reasons, we believe the Court will be more likely to cite transnational law when it exercises judicial review. Justices may be concerned with
congressional responses to their decisions because Congress can initiate and
support constitutional amendments to overturn judicial decisions, alter the
Court's composition, reduce the Court's budget, regulate Court procedure, hold
judicial salaries constant, strip the Court of jurisdiction, impeach and remove
Justices, and pass legislation that overrides Supreme Court decisions." Presidents can refuse to enforce the Court's decisions and order Cabinet Secretaries
and other high-ranking officials to ignore them.9 4 They can unilaterally create
their own executive policies and shift the policy status quo,95 mobilize interest
groups to attack and undermine the Court's decisions, 9 6 "use their agenda-

90. Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Origin and Development of
Stare Decisis at the U.S. Supreme Court, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 167, 167 (Kevin T

McGuire ed., 2012).
91. Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L. & Soc'Y Rav. 135, 135 (2006).

92. See Zink et al., supra note 83.
93. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional
Constraints on the Supreme Court's ConstitutionalRulings, 1987-2000, 31 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 533 (2006);
Ryan J. Owens, The Separationof Powers and Supreme CourtAgenda Setting, 54 AM. J. POL. Sc. 412

(2010).
94. See Clifford J. Carrubba & Christopher Zorn, Executive Discretion, JudicialDecision Making,
and Separationof Powers in the United States, 72 J. POL. 812, 812 (2010).
95. See Ryan C. Black et al., Adding Recess Appointments to the President's "Tool Chest" of

UnilateralPowers, 60 POL. Ras. Q. 645, 649 (2007).
96. See generally Mark A. Peterson, The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns
of Interest Group Liaison, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 612 (1992).
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setting power to focus public scrutiny on judicial decisions,"9 and "sign or veto
override legislation."9 8 Justices might pay close attention to the preferences of
these political actors, rendering their decisions within the boundaries of acceptable behavior. And these concerns would appear to be most relevant when the
Court strikes down legislation as unconstitutional. By showing how transnational law, and perhaps a growing worldwide consensus, supports the Court's
decision to strike down a law, Justices might be able to withstand scrutiny of
their opinion. 99
Accordingly, we hypothesize that when a majority opinion overrules precedent or exercises judicial review, it will be more likely to reference transnational law than when it does not overrule precedent or exercise judicial review.
3. Ideological Decisionmaking
As stated above, conventional wisdom holds that liberal Justices are more
likely to employ transnational law than conservative Justices.' 00 Just looking at
the breakdown among advocates and opponents of employing transnational law,
one might suspect that liberals would be more likely to cite foreign law than
conservatives. Robert Bork, for instance, has argued that the universalist impulse behind the former viewpoint is associated with judicial liberalism, as
liberals have a "tendency to search for the universal and to denigrate the
particular."' 0 ' Consequently, any empirical analysis of transnational law must
account for ideological tendencies among Justices.
Yet, there is considerable evidence to challenge the conventional wisdom
that ideology divides supporters and opponents of transnational law. Consider
Justice O'Connor. In 1995, she wrote a law review article which claimed that as
the United States "moves toward a more international regime of dispute resolution, [its] federalist ideal of healthy dialogue and mutual trust may possibly be
adapted to describe the proper relationship between domestic courts and transnational tribunals." 1 0 2 In Grutter v. Bollinger'0 3 and elsewhere, she relied on or
supported transnational laws and practices. 10 4 Moreover, despite their vocal pro-

97. Owens, supra note 93, at 414.
98. Id.

99. Of course, many citizens will for many reasons not be particularly persuaded by the Court's
invocation of transnational legal authority. Some, no doubt, will have their own opinions about the
propriety of such citation, and others might simply be skeptical if the only authority offered for a ruling
is transnational in nature and seems in tension with supposedly "core" American values. We simply
suggest that, for many more readers, more citations and more support, whatever their nature, might be
more persuasive and could defuse controversy.
100. See BORK, supra note 2; Farber, supra note 21.
101. BORK, supra note 2, at 22.
102. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalismof Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. IrN'I L. & POL. 35, 41 (1995).
Surprisingly, though, in 1997, she signed on to the majority opinion in Printz v. United States, which
castigated Justice Breyer's use of transnational law in his dissent. 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
103. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
104. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 7, at 350 ("[T]here is much to learn from other distinguished
jurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here.").
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tests against using transnational law to interpret domestic doctrine, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas employed transnational law to
support their positions. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 0 5- Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, which held that the Constitution observes no
right to assisted suicide, cited laws in Canada, Britain, New Zealand, Australia,
and Colombia.' 0 6 In his separate opinion in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Rehnquist referred to abortion decisions from
Canadian and German courts.' 07 Justices Thomas and Scalia joined each of
these opinions. 1o These inconsistencies challenge the conventional view that
liberals alone use transnational law. It is plausible, perhaps, that there are
principled distinctions that these conservatives may draw to support their
citations-for instance, Justice Scalia insists on a clear difference between
citations to the common law of England and citation to other transnational legal
authorities on the theory that the common law of England was likely on the
minds of the Framers of the Constitution.' 0 9 But Planned Parenthoodsuggests
that Scalia-just like his colleagues-may not be as consistent as conventional
wisdom suggests. Instead, we propose that all Justices may employ transnational law when it suits their dispositional and ideological goals.
That all Justices might use transnational law accords with our theory that
Justices use what they can to support potentially suspect decisions. Key elites
and the public are less likely to support a Court decision that is highly
polarizing and ideological. For example, Bailey and Maltzman found that a
decision justified solely on policy grounds would alienate citizens, whereas a
decision justified on constitutional (as opposed to policy) grounds could enhance support for that decision-even among citizens with lower levels of
general trust in the Court and greater predisposition to reject the decision."o
Our belief is that Justices, worrying about how an ultra-ideological decision will
look, will search for as many supporting grounds as possible, including transnational law. So, we expect that Justices who render a decision consistent
with their ideological motivations, worried about how that might appear, will be
more likely to cite transnational law to buttress their position. That is, we
hypothesize that Justices will be more likely to employ transnational law when
they render ideologically motivated decisions. Liberals will reference transnational law when they render liberal decisions, and conservatives will reference

105. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
106. See Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let It Talk": On the Use of External Norms in
ConstitutionalDecision Making, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 597, 604 n.34 (2004).
107. 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See Amann, supra note 106. Indeed, conservatives had good reason to search for international
law in the abortion context during some of the heated battles in the 1990s, because most of the available
transnational law suggested that the United States was the outlier in protecting rights to abortions. See
Dorsen, supra note 25, at 521.
109. See Dorsen, supra note 25, at 525.
110. See MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED CouRT- LAw, PoLTmCS, AND THE
DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 4 (2011).
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transnational law when they render conservative decisions.
4. Statistical Controls
To be sure that any findings that support our hypothesis are not confounded
by rival explanations, we must include some control measures in our model. We
first control for the effect of information. When more groups file briefs, the
Court is probably more likely to be exposed to, and thus cite, transnational law.
Accordingly, we measure the number of amicus briefs in each case. We also
control for whether the Court construes a treaty. Zaring finds that the Court is
more likely to reference and discuss foreign law when interpreting a provision
in a treaty.' Next, we control for whether the Court is constrained by Congress
and the President when it renders its decision. Justices might cite foreign
law-to bring in more supporting materials-when they are more liberal or
conservative than Congress and susceptible to political attack. Similarly, Black
and Epstein suggest that the Court may be more likely to reference transnational
law as Congress becomes more liberal.1 2 As Congress becomes "more cosmopolitan," they argue, "transjudicial communication should increase.""'3 Conversely, as politicians become more "isolationist," the Court may be less likely
to cite transnational law. 114 Given this suggestion, we control for the general
ideological mood of Congress. Finally, we control for Court Term to determine
whether the modem Court cites transnational law more than its predecessors.
Accounting for Court Term also allows us to capture the impact of technology,
with Justices having an easier time finding transnational law with modem
computing and the Internet.
B. GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE COURT'S USE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

If Justices use transnational law strategically, not only would they cite it for
support when they make controversial decisions, but they would also cite law
from countries most likely to be deemed legitimate by the public-countries
that have legal ideals similar to the United States. As Diane Amann intimates,
these will be countries with "norms that are grounded in the same respect for
freedom from undue state interference that animates U.S. constitutional culture."' 5 So, for example, "Zimbabwe-a country widely criticized as a human
rights violator-might not be the first to which a [U.S.] court would turn." 1 1 6 To
determine what countries are the likeliest candidates for citation, we turned to
literature on the attributes of states and the conditions under which they trade
and make alliances with one another. This scholarship led us to believe that the

111. See Zaring, supra note 55.
112. See Ryan C. Black & Lee Epstein, (Re-)Setting the Scholarly Agenda on Transjudicial
Communication, 32 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 791, 801 (2007).
113. Id. at 803.
114. Id.
115. Amann, supra note 106, at 606.
116. Id. at 606.
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Supreme Court will be most likely to look to countries that have experiences
similar to the United States, countries with whom the United States has military
alliances, and wealthy countries.
1. Countries with Shared Experiences
Literature on international trade finds that similar regime types trade with
each other more than they trade with dissimilar regimes. Similar countries are
more likely to understand how the institutions in one another's states operate,
and thus will find the transaction costs of trade diminished.' 7 They will also
believe the other state's institutions to be more legitimate." 8 This trade dynamic
is even more pronounced among democracies. Because democratic countries
are more likely to protect economic actors and individual rights than nondemocratic countries are, they find it more profitable to trade with each other. Indeed,
trading with democratic regimes is less risky because citizens of such governments are more likely to reject illegitimate nationalizations of business that
might jeopardize trade relations with the United States.
The same logic might lead the Supreme Court to reference law from countries that are democratic. Because democratic countries tend to reflect the
desires of their citizens better than authoritarian regimes, they are perceived to
be more legitimate. The Supreme Court, of course, feeds on legitimacy." 9 Thus,
looking toward more legitimate regimes is logical because if Justices seek to
bolster their opinions with additional logic and support, looking to the most
respected foreign countries simply makes the most sense.' 2 0 Thus, we expect
that the Supreme Court will be increasingly likely to employ transnational law
from countries that are more democratic.
Justices also should be more likely to cite countries whose legal and cultural
histories are similar to the United States. Countries with similar legal systems
are much more likely to understand and agree with one another's laws and
history. For example, common law systems are likely to understand the importance of precedent and the importance of incremental judicial change.121 In-

117. See William J. Dixon & Bruce E. Moon, Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade
Patterns, 46 PoL. RES. Q. 5, 6 (1993); see also Donald P. Green et al., Dirty Pool, 55 INT'L ORG. 441,
442 (2001).
118. See Harry Bliss & Bruce Russett, Democracy and Trade: Ties of Interest and Community, in
DEMOCRATIC PEACE FOR EUROPE: MYTH OR REALITY? 75, 76 (Gustaaf Geeraerts & Patrick Stouthuysen
eds., 1999); Harry Bliss & Bruce Russett, Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection,
1962-1989, 60 J. POL. 1126, 1126 (1998); James D. Morrow et al., The Political Determinants of
InternationalTrade: The Major Powers, 1907-90, 92 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 649, 649 (1998).
. 119. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in
the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1209, 1215 (1986); James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy
of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 343, 343 (1998).
120. Future work on this topic might also consider examining constitutional similarities among
countries by turning to the Comparative Constitutions Project. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONs PROJECT,
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/download-data (last visited May 29, 2014).
121. See Emilia Justyna Powell & Stephanie J. Rickard, InternationalTrade and Domestic Legal
Systems: Examining the Impact of Islamic Law, 36 INT'L INTERACTIONs 335, 339 (2010).
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deed, there is considerable evidence that common law countries tend to trade
with one another much more than with states with a civil law system, as
common law systems tend to have more effective enforcement of contracts than
other types of states.1 2 2 Given these natural complements, we expect that the
Supreme Court will be much more likely to reference countries with common
law traditions. And simply because Supreme Court Justices and the (majority of
the) American public speak English as the primary language, we expect them to
be more likely to reference transnational sources of law from English-speaking
countries.
2. Alliances
Scholarship suggests that states with similar regime types are more likely to
form military and trade alliances because of their shared interests. 123 Such states
"identify through shared norms and political culture," have similar, backgrounds, and often find themselves facing similar external hostile forces.1 2 4 This
is particularly true of democracies.1 2 5 Democracies tend to have strong attachments to the rule of law,1 2 6 making them eager to cooperate. Additionally,
because the public must largely approve of international agreements in democracies, the underlying agreements generate legitimacy and provide a credible
commitment to the deal.1 2 7 What is more, the domestic political costs suffered
by democratic leaders for noncooperation or reneging are great. That is, states
have strong reasons to believe that democracies will make good on their
international commitments because their leaders will suffer at the hands of their
electorates if they abandon their promises. "If a [democratically elected] leader
decides to renege on an international agreement, the leader will suffer potentially heavy domestic political costs because such an action will likely be out of
step with domestic political opinion .... 2 8 Thus, we expect that the Supreme
Court will be more likely to cite transnational law from countries with whom
the United States has defense alliances and those with whom the United States
trades.

122. See Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. EcoN. 453, 453 (2003).
123. See Ajin Choi, The Power of Democratic Cooperation, 28 INT'L SECURITY 142, 144 (2003);
Brian Lai & Dan Reiter, Democracy, Political Similarity, and InternationalAlliances, 1816-1992, 44 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 203, 203 (2000); Brett Ashley Leeds et al., Alliance Treaty Obligations and
Provisions, 1815-1944, 28 INT'L INTERACTIONS 237 (2002).
124. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the InternationalState, 88 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 384, 387 (1994).
125. See Brett Ashley Leeds, Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation, 43 AM. J. PoL. Sa. 979, 997 (1999).
126. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966).
127. See Lai & Reiter, supra note 123.
128. Id. at 206.
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3. Wealth and Location
The "gravity model" in many trade studies suggests that distance and economic production influence the decision to trade.1 2 9 States that are geographically closer are more likely to trade with one another. And states with larger
economies are more likely to trade with each other. Similar to the logic of
alliances, countries that have consistent contact and shared economic interests are more likely to be familiar with and understand each other's institutions, particularly political and military.' 30 We expect, then, that the

Supreme Court will be more likely to reference transnational laws from countries that are geographically close to the United States and countries with larger
economies.
4. Major Power Status
Finally, we examine whether the Court is more likely to cite a country
defined as a major power. The appearance of cherry picking a country from
which to cite is likely to be minimized when the country is a major power.
With major-power status comes recognition and notoriety. Additionally, major
powers tend to be more stable and durable,' 3 ' giving them an aura of legitimacy. What is more, there is evidence that major powers (like the United States)
are more likely to form alliances and defense pacts with one another.1 3 2 And
major powers tend to engage in extensive trade, especially when they are
allies.1 33 As such, we expect that the Court will be more likely to cite the law of
major powers than the law of nonmajor powers.
IV.

DATA

A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

To determine whether Justices strategically cite transnational law, we analyzed every formally decided full-opinion case, unsigned orally argued case,
and judgment of the Court handed down during the Court's 1953-2008 Terms.
Unlike existing studies, we searched for references to every country, along with
major international tribunals during our time period. We began by searching
every Supreme Court majority opinion for references to well over 200 countries
and international tribunals.1 3 4 We searched each opinion to determine whether

129. See JAN TINBERGEN, SHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY 263 (1962).

130. See Edward D. Mansfield & Rachel Bronson, Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements,
and InternationalTrade, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 94, 94 (1997).
131. See James D. Morrow, Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the CapabilityAggregation
Model ofAlliances, 35 Am. J. POL. Sci. 904, 913 (1991).
132. See Leeds et al., supra note 123, at 247.
133. See Mansfield & Bronson, supra note 130.
134. To determine the names of countries to search, we examined the State Department's list of
recognized countries around the world. See A-Z List of Country and Other Area Pages, U.S.
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the reference to the country was to:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

a foreign court decision;
the procedures or practices of a foreign court;
foreign law enforcement procedures;
the provisions of a foreign constitution;
formal government acts of a foreign country (such as laws, statutes,
regulations, codes, decrees, or directives);
informal government acts of a foreign country (such as debates, speeches,
or proposals);
international reports (for example, by the United Nations) or documents
that mention the country searched for;
the cultural, economic, political, or historical practices within a foreign
country;
international treaties; and
common law.

For each citation, we read the substance of the language and coded it for
whether the citation was positive/approving, negative/disapproving, mixed, or
neutral. We supplemented these data on citation type with other data from the
Supreme Court Database 3 5 and other content coding, which will be explained
more infra.
Before we proceed to discuss how we coded our data for the multivariate
study, we wish to present some descriptive data.13 6 Overall, we find 1699
citations in our sample across all the Court's published opinions (including
concurrences, special concurrences, dissents, and dissents in part). With 6212
cases in our dataset, these citations are distributed across only 6.39% of the total
cases (N=397 cases). Positive citations to these sources appear in only a
fraction of these cases, or 4.73% of all the cases in the dataset (N=294 cases).
The practice is, in other words, fairly rare.

DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/misc/list/index.htm (last visited May 29, 2014). While some
countries' names have changed, and new countries have sprung up, we examined their previous names
as well.
135. See The Supreme Court Database, WASH. UNIV. IN ST. Louis, http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited
Dec. 6, 2013).
136. We note that the descriptive data presented in Tables 1-4 include citations to these sources to
interpret treaties. However, only nineteen of the 6,212 cases analyzed involved the interpretation of a
treaty, and those nineteen cases only cited any of these sources a total of twenty-nine times.
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We can also take an initial look at how the Court used these various
authorities. As Table 1 indicates, foreign court decisions (15.19%), the procedures and practices of a foreign court (17.36%), formal government actions of a
foreign state (18.07%), the cultural practices within a foreign state (12.83%),
and foreign common law (15.24%) were the most used transnational sources; in
contrast, foreign constitutions (4.06%) and informal government actions (6.18%)
were relatively infrequently used.
Table 1: Treatment of Citation
Positive

Neutral

Negative

Mixed

Total

Court Decision

165

33

54

6

258

Court Procedures

151

44

86

14

295

20

0

53

2

75

Constitutional Provisions

40

3

18

8

69

Formal Government Acts

177

45

58

27

307

Informal Government Acts

72

26

7

0

105

7

2

11

0

20

Cultural, Economic, Historical
Practices

61

64

78

15

218

International Treaty

17

35

41

0

93

Common Law

170

7

62

20

259

Total

880

259

468

92

1699

Type

Law Enforcement Procedures

International Reports

Moreover, by coding each citation for how it was used, we begin to see that
certain types of sources are more associated with particular uses. For instance,
Justices negatively cited cultural, economic, political, or historical practices
within a foreign country (that is, to distinguish or disparage the practice) more
than they did positively or neutrally. Most of the other categories of sources are
more tilted toward positive or neutral citations.
Another way to slice the data is to examine where the citations appear.
Table 2 shows that some sources are associated with majority opinions and
others are associated with dissents. For instance, we find that foreign constitutional provisions, international reports, and cultural, economic, political, or
historical practices break the general mold, exhibiting a higher proportion of
citations in dissent than other categories.
And, as Table 3 indicates, positive citations of foreign authority are more
likely in majority opinions than they are in dissent, but so too are negative
citations. We find that 56.25% of all the positive citations appear in majority
opinions and that 51.28% of negative citations appear in majority opinions.
Because a small number of citations appear in concurrences, dissents do not
account for the rest, but they do account for significant proportions of both
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Table 2: Opinion in Which Citation Located
Majority

Regular
Concur

Special
Concur

Dissent
in Part

Dissent

Total

Court Decision

152

9

16

6

75

258

Court Procedures

181

13

18

9

74

295

47

5

3

1

19

75

Type

Law Enforcement Procedures
Constitutional Provisions

21

8

4

2

34

69

Formal Government Acts

178

16

5

6

102

307

Informal Government Acts

57

7

4

11

26

105

2

2

3

0

13

20

Cultural, Economic, Historical
Practices

85

19

32

11

71

218

International Treaty

76

0

11

0

6

93

Common Law

148

15

13

9

74

259

Total

947

94

109

55

494

1699

International Reports

positive and negative citations: 27.61% and 35.3%, respectively.
Moreover, as suggested by prior studies,' 3 7 it appears from the data in Table 4
that individual Justices engage in the practice at strikingly different rates than
commonly assumed. 13 8 If any ideological pattern emerges, it is that there is no
pattern. In short, the data suggest a more complicated pattern of citation than
popular accounts suggest.
Table 3: Opinion in Which Citation Located, by Treatment
Majority

Regular
Concur

Positive

495

53

Neutral

165

Negative

Treatment

Special
Concur

Dissent
in Part

Dissent

52

37

243

880

10

22

10

52

259

Total

240

26

29

8

165

468

Mixed

47

5

6

0

34

92

Total

947

94

109

55

494

1699

Although it is difficult to read too much into these descriptive data, they do at
least challenge common beliefs. The conventional story that liberal Justices cite
transnational law in support of majority opinions that depart from domestic

137. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
138. The Justices chosen for inclusion were selected to highlight the patterns of citation across
Justices with very different views on the propriety of citing transnational law.
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Table 4: Identity of Select Authors

Mixed

Total

8

2

43

3

5

1

12

0

3

1

16

24

2

3

0

29

9

0

5

0

14

Scalia

35

1

20

2

58

Stevens

40

7

30

2

79

Positive

Neutral

31

2

Ginsburg

3

Kennedy

12

O'Connor
Rehnquist

Justice
Breyer

Negative

law-and that conservative Justices object to that practice in dissent-is not
substantiated.
Our goals, again, were to go beyond mere descriptive analysis to determine
the conditions under which Justices cite transnational law, as well as the
countries whose laws they cite. Accordingly, we estimated two distinct models.
The dependent variable in our first model examines whether the majority
opinion cited a foreign source of law in support of the argument being made in
the opinion (1 if yes; 0 otherwise).1 4 0 The dependent variable in the second
model examines whether the Court positively cited the law of a particular
country. That is, our unit of analysis is the country-year dyad. If the Court
positively cited the country's laws, we coded the dependent variable as 1; 0
otherwise.
B. MODEL I EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

We coded our independent variables in the first model, which examines the
conditions under which Justices cite transnational law, as follows: Exercise of
JudicialReview equals 1 if the Court majority struck down an Act of Congress,
or struck down a state statute; 0 otherwise. Case Alters Precedent takes on a
value of I when the Court majority expressly overruled an existing Supreme
Court precedent; 0 otherwise. Liberal Case Outcome measures whether the
Court's decision in the case was liberal or conservative. 1 4 ' To determine Majority CoalitionIdeology, we followed political science conventions and examined
the ideal point of the median member of the majority coalition.1 4 2 In essence,

139. For illustrative purposes, we only present the most frequent users of transnational law in this
table.
140. Our results are statistically and substantively similar if we instead examine any reference to
foreign law in the majority opinion.
141. To determine whether the Court exercised judicial review, formally altered precedent, and
rendered a liberal or conservative decision, we relied on the Supreme Court Database. See Supreme
Court Database, supra note 135.
142. See Cliff Carrubba et al., Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 Am. J.

POL. Sci. 400, 400 (2012).
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this convention assumes that the most central member of the majority coalition
is the best approximation of the overall ideological valence of that coalition. We
measure this ideology variable using the oft-used Martin-Quinn scores.
The Martin-Quinn scores essentially track the voting behavior of Justices
relative to one another and generate estimates for how liberal or conservative each Justice is.' 4 3 Justices with smaller values are more liberal while
Justices with larger values are more conservative. Justice William Douglas was
the most liberal Justice on the Court; Justice Clarence Thomas is the most
conservative.
We coded our controls as follows: Amicus Briefs counts the total number
of amicus curiae briefs filed at the merits stage of the case. We obtained data
for 1953-2001 from Collins.I44 Using LexisNexis, we collected amicus data
from 2002-2009. Court Term is simply the Term in which the Court rendered its decision. Case Involved Treaty Interpretation is a dummy variable coded 1 if the Supreme Court Database determines that the case interpreted a treaty. Constrained Court is a binary variable that takes on a value
of I if the Court median, as determined by the Judicial Common Space
Scores,' 4 5 was more conservative or liberal than both the House and Senate
medians during the Terms in question; 0 otherwise. Legislative Liberalism
is simply the average of the House and Senate median Judicial Common
Space scores for the term in question. Negative values represent increasing
liberalism in these scores. Finally, we used James Stimson's first-dimension
Policy Mood Scores to develop a measure of Public Liberalism. We include this measure to control for the possibility that any effects can be traced
to the Justices' propensity to respond to swings in the national ideological
climate.1 4 6
C. MODEL 2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

We coded the following independent variables for a model examining the
countries to which Justices make citations. To examine our hypotheses about the
role of shared experiences, we first coded each country's Polity Score. We relied
on the Polity IV Project scores to determine the authority characteristics of

143. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlofor the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145-46 (2002); see also
Martin-Quinn Scores, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php (last visited
May 29, 2014).
144. See COLLINS, JR., supra note 56, at 187-96.
145. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. EcoN. & ORG..303
(2007). These data provide comparable ideal point estimates (i.e., estimates of preferences) of all
federal courts and judges, Congress, and the President. See id.
146. The first-dimension Policy Mood Scores chart the public's support for government on a
liberal-conservative continuum. See generally JAMES A. STLISON, PULIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS,
CYCLES, AND SWINGS (2d ed. 1999). Up-to-date Policy Mood Scores can be accessed via the Policy
Agendas Project website. See Datasets & Codebooks, POLICY AGENDAS PROJECT, http://www.policy
agendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#policy-moods (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
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countries around the world and over time. 1 4 7 The Polity measures, used extensively in international relations scholarship, examine how autocratic or democratic a state is.148 Negative scores reflect a country that is more autocratic,
while positive scores reflect a country that is increasingly democratic.1 4 9 We
next examined the Government Longevity of each country's regime. Government longevity simply measures the number of years in which the country has
received that same Polity score.
Next, we measured whether the country's legal system was based on the
Common Law, as well as whether English was the country's official language (or one of its official languages). If the country was based on the
common law, the variable received a value of 1; 0 otherwise. Further, if the
country spoke English as an official language, English received a value of 1; 0
otherwise.
To determine whether the United States had a defensive military alliance with
the country, we turned to the Correlates of War (COW) database.1 5 0 If COW

noted that the United States had a defensive alliance with the country, we coded
Alliance with U.S. as 1; 0 otherwise. Following the gravity model, we measured
the GeographicDistancefrom U.S. as the number of miles between Washington, D.C. and each country's capital. We also measured each country's Real
GDP. Finally, we included a dummy variable Preferential Trade Agreement,
with a value of I if the United States maintains a preferential trade agreement
with that nation; 0 otherwise.
We controlled for the yearly amount of exports from each country to the
United States (Exportsfrom Country), as well as the United States' exports to
each country (Exports to Country). We also coded whether (1) or not (0) COW
asserts the country is a Major Power. Finally, we controlled for the Year of the
decision to eliminate any time-based effects from the model.
V.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

To recap, we estimate two models: one seeks to identify the conditions under
which majority opinions cite transnational law, our hypothesis being that Justices are more likely to cite transnational law when they are overruling precedent or striking statutes, and especially when doing so supports their ideological
predispositions; the second seeks to identify the countries the Court cites, our
hypothesis being that Justices are more likely to cite to countries that share key

147. See Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: PoliticalRegime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2012, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

(last visited Dec. 6, 2013).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See Datasets, CORRELATES OF WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets.htm
Dec. 6, 2013).

(last visited
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characteristics with the United States. In both cases, we estimate the models
using logistic regression, with random effects in Model 2.'' These specifications allow us to assess the probability that the Court moved from a negative
value (that is, no citation to foreign material) to a positive value (that is, citation
to foreign material) based on the effect of the independent variables included in
the models.
A. MODEL 1: MAJORITY OPINION CITATION TO TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Table 5 shows the results from our first model, which addresses the conditions under which a Supreme Court majority opinion positively employs transnational law. We find strong support for our hypotheses. Justices are more likely to
reference transnational sources of law when they strike down federal and state
legislation, when they overrule precedent, and when they decide cases in an
ideological fashion. That is, conservatives and liberals both use transnational
law.1 5 2 The significant coefficient for Public Liberalism suggests that the use of
transnational law is, in fact, partially attributable to the Justices' read on the
ideological preferences of the public (namely, the Justices are more likely to cite
transnational law when the public becomes increasingly liberal).' 5 3 Importantly,
the model strongly supports our main hypotheses even after taking account of
this effect.

151. Random effects models are one method for achieving unbiased regression estimates from panel
data when there is unobserved heterogeneity in individual subjects. Another method is fixed effect
models. As long as key assumptions hold true-namely, that the unobserved characteristics are
unrelated to the other explanatory variables and are, in effect, random-random effects models yield
unbiased estimates. See ORLEY ASHENFELTER ET AL., STATISTICS AND EcONOMETICS: METHODS AND APPLICA-

264-73 (2003).
152. One item to consider is the role of English common law. That is, some Justices may consult
the common law to determine how it informs an original understanding of the Constitution. See
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. To account for this dynamic, we refit our models excluding references to English common law. Our results are quite similar to the results we present.
In our first model (which looks at the conditions under which cases cited transnational law),
the Constrained Court variable becomes positive and statistically significant (meaning the Court
cites transnational law more often when it is more conservative or liberal than Congress). The Public
Liberalism coefficient becomes slightly less significant (p < 0.07). Most importantly, the slope
of the Liberal Outcome x Majority Ideology variable is less pronounced and the range for which
the difference is significant decreases somewhat (i.e., the range runs from -2.27 to 0.42). The
results of our revised second model, see infra Table 6, are nearly identical to the results we present
here.
153. There is a long-running interest in the literature in the extent to which the Supreme Court tends
to follow public preferences, but little agreement on whether or why it does. See generally BARRY
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); Casillas et al., supra note 84; Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279
(1957); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly
Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010).
TIONs
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Model Parameter Estimates of the Conditions Under Which a
Supreme Court Majority Positively Refers to Transnational Material
Variable
Exercise of Judicial Review

0.520* (0.195)

Case Alters Precedent

1.147* (0.258)

Number of Amicus Briefs

0.034* (0.010)

Court Term

0.009 (0.005)

Case Involved Treaty Interpretation

2.688* (0.502)

Liberal Case Outcome

0.412* (0.183)

Majority Coalition Ideology

0.410* (0.162)

Liberal Outcome x Majority Ideology
Constrained Court
Legislative Liberalism
Public Liberalism
Constant

*

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

-0.581* (0.194)
0.212 (0.154)
0.994 (0.703)
0.041* (0.019)
-22.991 (11.456)

Observations

6212

Log Likelihood

-1135.039

54
denotes p < 0.05 (two-tailed test).1

To illustrate these results, we calculate predicted probabilities. Consider, first,
the conditional relationship between outcome and ideology.' 55 We hypothesized
that a majority opinion would be more likely to include transnational law when
reaching a decision that was ideologically consistent with the composition of
the majority coalition. Figure 1 provides strong support for this assertion. We
show majority ideology on the x-axis (with increasingly negative values indicating more liberal majorities and increasingly positive values indicating more
conservative majorities) and the likelihood of citing transnational law on the
y-axis. The different line types within the plot itself show separately when the
direction of the decision is conservative or liberal.

154. P-values represent the probability, under repeated sampling, of observing a parameter estimate
that is at least as extreme as the one we obtained when the true value of the parameter is actually zero.
When that probability is very low (here, less than 5%), then we say that we have sufficient evidence to
reject the null hypothesis that the parameter is equal to zero (i.e., no effect exists). Two-tailed p-values
allow for the possibility that the true value of the parameter estimate could be either positive or
negative, and, as a result, are more demanding than their one-tailed counterpart.
155. Note that even though the coefficient on Majority Coalition Ideology is positive and statistically significant, one must interpret that coefficient differently than the noninteracted coefficients
because it is part of the interactive term as well. That is, the positive coefficient on Majority Coalition
Ideology essentially shows the effect of ideology when Liberal Outcome is held at zero. In other words,
it shows the effect of increasing conservatism when there is an increasingly conservative outcome in a
case.
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Figure 1: Probability Court References Foreign Law as a
Function of Ideology 15 6
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Starting with a conservative decision outcome, we estimate roughly a 0.01
probability of observing a positive reference to transnational law when the
majority coalition itself is very liberal. When the coalition is very conservative,
however, that likelihood jumps to around 0.06. Consider, next, a majority
opinion that reaches a liberal outcome. As the plot reveals, we observe exactly
the opposite trend: liberal coalitions are more than twice as likely to cite
approvingly transnational materials in their liberal opinions than are their
conservative counterparts. Simply put, when rendering ideologically motivated
decisions, Justices pepper their opinions with transnational law as a backstop.
The data also show that liberal and conservative Justices call upon transnational law. Our data reveal no significant differences between conservatives and
liberals in their tendency to cite transnational law. When comparing a liberal
majority/liberal outcome versus a conservative majority/conservative outcome,
we find no significant difference between the two probabilities of a positive

156. Solid lines represent predicted probability of referencing transnational law. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence intervals surrounding those predictions. Recall that smaller values of Justice ideology
(on the x-axes) represent increasingly liberal outcomes and large values represent increasingly conservative outcomes.
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citation (p = 0.72, two-tailed test). Similarly, we also find no significant
difference i the probability of transnational law citation between a liberal
majority/conservative outcome and a conservative majority/liberal outcome
(p = 0.11, two-tailed test). In short, the conventional understanding that only
liberal Justices employ foreign law is mistaken.
Moving beyond the ideological use of transnational law, Figure 2 shows that
Justices are moved, to a small degree, by public opinion. Justices also are
significantly more likely to employ transnational law when they exercise judicial review and overrule precedent. When the majority opinion merely upholds
a statute, the Court's probability of employing transnational materials is roughly
0.04. When, however, the Court majority strikes down a statute, that probability
increases by 50% to approximately 0.06.'15 Next, consider the act of overruling
one of its own precedents. When the Court upholds an existing precedent, it has
only a 0.04 probability of employing transnational law. Yet, when it makes the
important decision to overrule its previous precedent, the Court's likelihood of
referencing transnational law jumps to 0.11-nearly triple the baseline value.
Thus, when the Court makes its most dramatic decisions, it pulls from transnational sources of law. No wonder the practice of citing transnational law
generates controversy in many cases; Justices cite it in their most controversial
decisions. Yet they also tend to cite it when the public gives them license to be
controversial, as our data show that a more liberal public-as measured by
Policy Mood scores-leads to an increase from a baseline probability of about

0.04 to a probability of 0.05.
Our controls largely perform as expected.
amicus briefs are just over 40% more likely to
with a small number of briefs. Unsurprisingly,
tial, with treaty cases nearly ten times as likely
nontreaty cases.

Cases with a large number of
cite transnational law than those
the treaty effect is also substanto employ transnational law than

B. MODEL 2: THE COUNTRIES CITED

As we expected, the Court uses transnational law to support its most controversial decisions-those that are ideologically motivated, exercise judicial review,
and undo precedent. What about the second half of our theory? Do Justices
strategically cite legitimate countries? The answer is yes. Figure 3 illustrates the
countries the Supreme Court cited. Countries in gray are those the Supreme
Court cited favorably. The white squares over the country's capital are proportionate to the number of positive references. The five countries most frequently
cited positively were the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, and
Switzerland. All of these countries share important characteristics with the

157. This result holds if we include separate dummy variables for whether a federal law or state law
is being struck down. Both are more likely than the baseline-no law being struck down-to observe
the usage of foreign law. A Wald test comparing the two coefficients fails to reveal any significant
difference between the two separate variables.
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Figure 2 Probability Court References Foreign Law, Controls 5 8
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United States, and all would seem to be legitimate in the eyes of the American
public and legal elites.
Looking more specifically at our hypotheses, Table 6 shows that Justices do
in fact cite those countries most likely to be deemed legitimate by the American
public and by elites.1 5 9 Consider, first, our shared experience hypothesis. We
argued that Justices would be most likely to cite transnational law from countries that are democratic, are durable, speak English, and use the common law.
The data support three of these four expectations: namely, the first three listed
above.

158. The solid dots reflect predicted probability of referencing transnational law, with the numbers
in brackets reflecting the 95% confidence intervals surrounding those predictions.
159. Note that although we have foreign law data through most of 2009, our model only includes
observations up through 2000 due to data availability on several key country-level measures.
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Figure 3: Countries Cited Positively by the Supreme Court, 1953-2000

As the left panel of Figure 4 shows, fully democratic countries are more than
twenty-five times more likely to be positively referenced by the Court than

Table 6: Random Effects Logistic Regression Model Parameter Estimates of
Conditions Under Which a Supreme Court Majority Opinion Positively
Refers to Legal Material from a Given Country in a Given Year
Variable

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Polity Score

0.171* (0.041)

Government Longevity

0.016* (0.007)

English is Official Language

1.642* (0.791)

Common Law Country
Alliance with U.S.
Country is a Major Power
Distance from U.S.
Country Wealth
Imports from Country

-0.728 (0.771)
0.542 (0.393)
2.560* (0.592)
0.023 (0.104)
0.121* (0.028)
-0.040* (0.015)

U.S. Exports to Country

0.045* (0.022)

Preferential Trade Agreement with U.S.

-0.019 (1.043)

Year

-0.014 (0.010)

Constant

19.986 (20.540)

p
Observations

0.152* (0.067)

Log Likelihood

5237
-373.752

* denotes p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). p (i.e., the Greek letter "rho") reports the estimate of the
total amount of variance contributed by the panel-level (i.e., country) variance component.
Because it is significantly greater than 0, we can conclude that the model including random
effects is superior to a model that pools all countries together.
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those that are fully autocratic.160 Turning to the middle panel, if we examine a
country's English language and major power status, we observe that the Court
has only a 0.001 likelihood of citing a non-English speaking country that is not
a major power. On the other hand, when the country is an English-speaking
major power, the Court cites that country with a 0.085 probability. A nonEnglish speaking major power and an English-speaking nonmajor power are
cited with probabilities of 0.017 and 0.007, respectively. Finally, the durability
of the country matters (right panel). Countries with political stability of 120
years (roughly the ninety-ninth percentile in our data) are just over six times
more likely to be cited than those where dramatic changes have been observed
(that is, durability is zero-the sample minimum in our data). Taken together,

Figure 4: Probability Court References Country as a Function of
Country Characteristics1 6 1
The Influence of Political Attributes
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160. As the scale on the y-axis reveals, with a maximum plotted value of 0.015 (i.e., 1.5%), the raw
probabilities are far from overwhelming. This, of course, is due to the high prevalence of zeroes in our
data-roughly 97%.
161. The solid dots reflect predicted probability of referencing a country, with the numbers in
brackets reflecting the 95% confidence intervals surrounding those predictions. Further, the solid lines
represent predicted probabilities of referencing a country. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals
surrounding those predictions.
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the results suggest the Court is most likely to cite foreign countries that are
highly legitimate and have certain characteristics similar to the United States.
Finally, in Figure 5 we consider the role of economic variables such as trade
flows and wealth. Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between the
amount of physical imports that come into the United States from a country
and the amount of law the Court imports from that country. The Court is more
than thirty times more likely to import law from a country from which the
United States has no physical imports compared with those from which the
United States has substantial imports. 16 2
Figure 5: Probability Court References Country as a Function of Economic Interests1 6 3
The Influence of Economic Attributes
U.S. Exports to Country

imports to U.S. from Country

Country Wealth

0

d

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

-

- -

-

-

I

8--0

20

40

60

'tmd1y import ftom CaMy (BMo

8D
of Donals)

0

10

20

30

40

1tarly Exports to Courery (BonsOC

50
ofDoars)

0
Country

S

10

15

2D

25

GDP Per Capita (Toatnads of Doaas)

Turning to the middle panel, which portrays U.S. exports to a country, we
uncover a positive relationship, with the Court being roughly eleven times
more likely to import law from a country to which the United States exports a

162. The maximum plotted value-about 90 billion dollars-corresponds to imports from Japan in
the early 1980s. With 300 billion dollars, the sample maximum is Canada in 2000. One post hoc
explanation is that this finding is perhaps driven partly by China, whose laws are unlikely to be cited
positively in U.S. courts for other reasons.
163. The solid lines represent predicted probabilities of referencing a country. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence intervals surrounding those predictions.
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substantial amount of physical goods.6 Rounding out the figure, the right
panel shows that the Court is fifteen times more likely to cite materials from
a country where per capita income is high than from one where it is low. As
Table 6 shows, however, whether the United States maintains a preferential
trade agreement with a nation does not have any statistically significant effect
on the probability that the Court will borrow that country's law.
VI. DiscussIoN
Our results show that legal academic debates about the Supreme Court's
practice of citing transnational law are woefully off point or mistaken in key
assumptions. Clearly, certain critiques of the practice hinge more on one's
theory of law-a dimension our empirical analysis cannot resolve. Yet insofar
as one's concern is with the patternsby which the Court cites transnational law,
our findings effectively undercut many simple and reductionist critiques of the
process.
As discussed above, one of the concerns about the Court's citation of
transnational law centers on a belief that the Court cites such law opportunistically, using a source when it supports one's position and ignoring it when
it does not. Our findings support this belief. Majority coalitions are more likely
to cite foreign law the more the holding aligns with their ideology and the
more extreme the ideology of the coalition is. We find that the Court is
essentially citing transnational law in cases where ideological preferences of the majority coalition drive the Court to hold statutes unconstitutional or alter precedent. Together, these covariates seem to suggest that the
Court's use of transnational law is really a form of overcompensation: as the
Court renders controversial decisions, it resorts to citation to transnational
authorities to create the illusion that it is acting with considerable supporting
precedent.
On the other hand, Justices appear to be at least somewhat circumscribed to
the extent that they borrow primarily from countries that are most like the
United States. It seems that the Court is limiting itself to citation of transnational law that is likely understandable and relatable to the American experience. One of the strongest defenses offered by Justice Breyer is that the
citations, although not controlling, are at least a reflection of a process designed
to make valid comparisons across similar legal and sociopolitical circumstances-to draw upon the expertise gathered through similar experiences in
similar nations. To the extent that the Court does borrow, it appears to borrow
from countries the public sees as the most legitimate. Perhaps there are-at least
some-bounds on the citation of transnational law after all.

164. The maximum plotted value-about 55 billion dollars--corresponds to exports to Canada in
the early 1970s. With 218 billion dollars, the sample maximum is Canada in 2000.
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At the same time, these findings address the conventional view that ideology
divides supporters and opponents of transnational law. Speaking to the ongoing
normative debate over whether the Court should use transnational legal sources
to interpret U.S. law, the seasoned journalist Tony Mauro stated:
[T]his is an important debate about the Court's role. Conservatives who
believe in a limited role for judges say the Supreme Court should interpret the
U.S. Constitution as written, and should ignore current fads here or abroad.
But the counterargument is strong. If globalization has flattened the world in
terms of the economy and culture, isn't it time that our legal system also look
beyond our borders?1 65
The comment, we believe, gives too much credence to the normative rhetoric
offered by academics and judges alike. The discussion over whether conservatives have legitimate reasons to resist the citation of transnational law is a red
herring. Liberals and conservatives both employ foreign law because they are
both ideologically motivated, strategic judicial actors who seek support for their
ideological positions. The Court employs transnational law in the most controversial of cases-when Justices strike federal law, when they overturn precedent,
and when they render ideologically anchored decisions. The practice is not,
therefore, based on an ideological or theoretical divide; rather, it is a function of
modern Justices seeking to effectuate their policy goals in the face of extralegal
resistance. Indeed, in nontreaty cases, moderately conservative coalitions rendering liberal decisions employ a variety of transnational sources. In fact, they cite
more transnational sources of law than liberal coalitions that render conservative decisions. Put plainly, normative debates should turn away from whether a
liberal or conservative position on the matter is correct as a normative matter.
Political scientists and legal scholars alike should not make the mistake of
thinking that the Justices on the Supreme Court care much at all about the
theoretical, legal, and normative debates about whether it is proper to cite
transnational law. The Justices instead seem to have embraced foreign law, in
deed if not in word.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as in some previous studies, we find that
the citation of transnational material is the exception rather than the rule.
Although the substantive changes in the probability of citing transnational law
or the law of a particular country are significant, the absolute probabilities are
low, at least in majority opinions.1 6 6 The Supreme Court is still indeed a
domestically centered court.

165. Curry & Miller, supra note 53, at 1097 (alteration in original).
166. It seems probable, though we do not test it here, that a good deal of the total references to
foreign law comes in dissents-a practice that presents fewer concerns. Indeed, prior research suggests
that most citations come in dissent. See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 108-11.
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CONCLUSION

This Article started with a vignette on the recent Kiobel case. While that case
was controversial in certain ways and with certain legal communities, the fact
that the unanimous Supreme Court cited transnational law was not particularly
controversial. How could this be after all the criticism the Court received for
citing transnational law in cases like Lawrence v. Texas, Roper v. Simmons, and
Atkins v. Virginia? Why were there no objections?
One reason is that the dispute itself turned on a domestic statute that by its
terms triggered a discussion about transnational law. A second reason, however,
and one supported by our data, is that there were no complaints because there
were no losers on the Court-indeed, the decision was unanimous, and the only
disagreements were relatively minor ones about the appropriate test for invoking extraterritorial jurisdiction. Our models support a theoretical perspective
that puts the ideological and strategic goals of all Justices at the forefront. If the
Court is deeply divided on a controversial case that departs from precedent or
breaks new ground, the Justices in the majority have every reason to cite foreign
law in an effort to legitimate their opinion, and the Justices in the minority have
every reason to focus on the majority's use of foreign law. Indeed, it may be the
only kind of legalistic (that is, non-ideological) complaint that dissenters can
lodge. But if, as in Kiobel, all or most of the Justices agree on the basic outcome
(by far the typical pattern), the use of transnational law carries no importance
except insofar as it can help all the Justices support their opinions. The citations
still occur regularly in these kinds of cases (since the incentives to support a
decision are still there), but the controversy fades. The contrast between the
response in Kiobel and the response in Lawrence, for instance, shows that what
drives debates about the practice is really outcomes, not the citations themselves. Political scientists have long noted the ideological behavior of Justices
in high-stakes constitutional judicial review, and our findings suggest that the
battle over transnational law citation is simply a proxy battle in important,
highly ideological cases that would have likely been decided the same way with
or without the citation to transnational law. When Justices criticize the practice,
we ought to read their protests as little more than protests of defeat because
there is now ample evidence to suggest that the same Justices will do the same
thing in another case when the stars are more aligned in their favor.
If the use of transnational law is instrumental, then there may be good reason
to accept critiques of the practice that center on the opportunism and inconsistency of the practice. Our evidence speaks to these practical concerns, though
the findings ultimately cut both ways. There is indeed significant evidence of
opportunism. Liberal majorities reaching liberal outcomes are more likely to
cite foreign law, and conservative majorities reaching conservative outcomes
are more likely to cite foreign law, suggesting that the more extreme an opinion
is ideologically speaking, the more the majority feels the need to use transnational law to justify what might be an insupportable decision. This opportunistic
use of transnational law does pose some risks of inconsistency and incoherence
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in the law, especially if future Courts treat these opportunistic citations with
precedential effect. On the other hand, we also present evidence that the Justices
are consistent in citation practices, and that they mostly cite nations whose
characteristics, traditions, and relations with the United States provide a high
likelihood that the Justices will in fact find meaningful similarities and comparisons. In short, practical critiques of the use of transnational law to interpret
domestic law turn on how the Justices actually go about citing transnational law,
and our findings suggest that the Court engages in the practice primarily to
advance ideological or policy goals but limits itself to maximize the persuasive
and legitimizing value of transnational law.
Altogether, our findings caution against reading too much into the oftenvigorous debates about the importance of using or excluding transnational law.
The findings may counsel caution in similar debates about other judicial practices, such as the citation of canons of construction or the citation of legislative
history. Consistent with the larger political science literature on judicial behavior, we suggest that the Justices in practice are driven more by political and
pragmatic considerations than any highbrowed theoretical account of proper
interpretation. Efforts to generate a comprehensive and objective normative
theory of transnational law citation are not necessarily flawed or hopeless, 6 7
but they certainly cannot expect the root behavioral and institutional causes of
the practice to magically disappear.

167. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at 129-30 (describing the bare minimum essentials of any
defensible theory of the citation of transnational law and sharply critiquing the Court for failing to live
up to expectations).

